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(In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment (2023)
Journal Article
Possajennikov, A., & Saran, R. (2023). (In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 216, 42-61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.003

The paper investigates two-player double-auction bargaining with private values in a setting with discrete two-point overlapping distributions of traders' valuations. We characterize parameter settings in which there exists a fully efficient equilibr... Read More about (In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment.

Measuring “Group Cohesion” to Reveal the Power of Social Relationships in Team Production (2023)
Journal Article
Gächter, S., Starmer, C., & Tufano, F. (2023). Measuring “Group Cohesion” to Reveal the Power of Social Relationships in Team Production. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1-45. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01283

We introduce "group cohesion" to study the economic relevance of social relationships in team production. We operationalize measurement of group cohesion, adapting the "oneness scale" from psychology. A series of experiments, including a pre-register... Read More about Measuring “Group Cohesion” to Reveal the Power of Social Relationships in Team Production.

The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence (2021)
Journal Article
Galeotti, F., Montero, M., & Poulsen, A. (2022). The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence. Management Science, 68(4), 2377-3174. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4025

We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money payoffs, the attraction effect and compromise effect (AE and CE) in bargaining, namely, a tendency for bargainers to agree to an intermediate option (C... Read More about The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence.