Professor MARIA MONTERO's Outputs (15)

Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment (2023)
Journal Article
Burdea, V., Montero, M., & Sefton, M. (2023). Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 113-149. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.011

We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of... Read More about Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment.

Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox (2023)
Book Chapter
Montero, M. (2023). Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox. In S. Kurz, N. Maaser, & A. Mayer (Eds.), Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century (159-171). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10

It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalitio... Read More about Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox.

“Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games (2023)
Journal Article
Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2023). “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games. Annals of Operations Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05179-8

This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the... Read More about “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games.

Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities (2022)
Journal Article
Montero, M. (2022). Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities. Dynamic Games and Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00460-0

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay if any set of coalitions profits from merging. Even under this strong cond... Read More about Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities.

An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games (2021)
Journal Article
Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2021). An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games. Games, 13(1), Article 5. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010005

This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets her demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of o... Read More about An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games.

Naivety about hidden information: An experimental investigation (2021)
Journal Article
Montero, M., & Sheth, J. D. (2021). Naivety about hidden information: An experimental investigation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 192, 92-116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.032

The unraveling prediction of disclosure theory relies on the idea that strategic forces lead firms (information senders) to voluntarily disclose information about the quality of their products provided the information disclosed is verifiable and the... Read More about Naivety about hidden information: An experimental investigation.

The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence (2021)
Journal Article
Galeotti, F., Montero, M., & Poulsen, A. (2022). The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence. Management Science, 68(4), 2377-3174. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4025

We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money payoffs, the attraction effect and compromise effect (AE and CE) in bargaining, namely, a tendency for bargainers to agree to an intermediate option (C... Read More about The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence.

Efficiency versus equality in bargaining (2018)
Journal Article
Galeotti, F., Montero, M., & Poulsen, A. (2019). Efficiency versus equality in bargaining. Journal of European Economic Association, 17(6), 1941-1970. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy030

© The Author(s) 2019. We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization.We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a... Read More about Efficiency versus equality in bargaining.

Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments (2017)
Journal Article
Miller, L., Montero, M., & Vanberg, C. (2018). Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 107, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.003

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect e... Read More about Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments.

Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization (2017)
Journal Article
Montero, M. (2017). Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12(3), https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016019

This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpret... Read More about Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization.

Communication, leadership and coordination failure (2017)
Journal Article
Dong, L., Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2018). Communication, leadership and coordination failure. Theory and Decision, 84(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9617-9

We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-tal... Read More about Communication, leadership and coordination failure.

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games (2015)
Journal Article
Montero, M., Possajennikov, A., Sefton, M., & Turocy, T. L. (2016). Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games. Economic Theory, 61(1), 55-89. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0902-y

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battlefields may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed discrete budget across battlefields. Each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to... Read More about Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games.

A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability (2015)
Journal Article
Montero, M. (2015). A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability. Games, 6(2), https://doi.org/10.3390/g6020039

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (b... Read More about A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability.

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players (2015)
Journal Article
Arin, J., Feltkamp, V., & Montero, M. (2015). A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players. Annals of Operations Research, 229(1), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1841-5

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (J Math Econ 43:855-870, 2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:55-72, 1997). A... Read More about A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players.

Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting (2014)
Book Chapter
Montero, M. (in press). Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting. In Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1

This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilib... Read More about Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting.