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Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox

Montero, Maria

Authors



Contributors

Sascha Kurz
Editor

Nicola Maaser
Editor

Alexander Mayer
Editor

Abstract

It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better off as a result. This appears paradoxical, even more so since the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. The example shows that, even though actually being selected to propose is always valuable ex post, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.

Citation

Montero, M. (2023). Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox. In S. Kurz, N. Maaser, & A. Mayer (Eds.), Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century (159-171). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10

Online Publication Date May 5, 2023
Publication Date May 5, 2023
Deposit Date Aug 8, 2022
Publicly Available Date May 6, 2025
Publisher Springer
Pages 159-171
Series Title Studies in Choice and Welfare
Series ISSN 2197-8530
Book Title Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century
ISBN 978-3-031-21695-4
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/9898569
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10
Related Public URLs https://link.springer.com/book/9783031216954
Additional Information First Online: 5 May 2023
Contract Date May 10, 2022