Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

Arin, J.; Feltkamp, V.; Montero, Maria

Authors

J. Arin franciscojavier.arin@ehu.es

V. Feltkamp Feltkamp@msm.nl



Abstract

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (J Math Econ 43:855-870, 2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:55-72, 1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and conflict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (Eur J Oper Res 216:208-213, 2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are fully rational, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Mar 29, 2015
Journal Annals of Operations Research
Print ISSN 0254-5330
Electronic ISSN 1572-9338
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 229
Issue 1
APA6 Citation Arin, J., Feltkamp, V., & Montero, M. (2015). A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players. Annals of Operations Research, 229(1), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1841-5
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1841-5
Keywords Game theory, Veto players, Bargaining, Serial rule
Publisher URL http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10479-015-1841-5
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1841-5

Files

PostprintRepository.pdf (302 Kb)
PDF

Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





You might also like



Downloadable Citations

;