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Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting

Montero, Maria

Authors



Abstract

This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilibrium does not satisfy two adequacy postulates, namely ignoring dummies and vanishing only for dummies. This paper shows that it does not respect dominance either. It is also argued that the equilibrium displays one of the less intuitive instances of the paradox of new members.

Citation

Montero, M. (in press). Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting. In Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé MachoverSpringer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1

Acceptance Date Jan 31, 2012
Online Publication Date Apr 19, 2014
Deposit Date Oct 13, 2017
Publicly Available Date
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Series Title Studies in choice and welfare
Book Title Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
ISBN 978-3-319-05157-4
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1
Public URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/47213
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-05158-1_17
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf