Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting

Montero, Maria

Abstract

This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilibrium does not satisfy two adequacy postulates, namely ignoring dummies and vanishing only for dummies. This paper shows that it does not respect dominance either. It is also argued that the equilibrium displays one of the less intuitive instances of the paradox of new members.

Citation

Montero, M. (in press). Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting. In Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1

• Acceptance Date: Jan 31, 2012
• Online Publication Date: Apr 19, 2014
• Deposit Date: Oct 13, 2017
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Series Title: Studies in choice and welfare
• Book Title: Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• ISBN: 978-3-319-05157-4
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/726798
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-05158-1_17
• Contract Date: Oct 12, 2017