Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization

Montero, Maria

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.

Citation

Montero, M. (2017). Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12(3), https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016019

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 19, 2017
• Publication Date: Oct 24, 2017
• Deposit Date: Jul 20, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 24, 2017
• Journal: Quarterly Journal of Political Science
• Print ISSN: 1554-0626
• Electronic ISSN: 1554-0634
• Publisher: Now Publishers
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 3
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016019
• Keywords: legislative bargaining, weighted voting, proportional; payoffs
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/889530
• Publisher URL: http://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-16019
• Contract Date: Jul 20, 2017