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Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization

Montero, Maria

Authors

Maria Montero maria.montero@nottingham.ac.uk



Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Oct 24, 2017
Journal Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Print ISSN 1554-0626
Electronic ISSN 1554-0634
Publisher Now Publishers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 12
Issue 3
APA6 Citation Montero, M. (2017). Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12(3), doi:10.1561/100.00016019
DOI https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016019
Keywords legislative bargaining, weighted voting, proportional
payoffs
Publisher URL http://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-16019
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0





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