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Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization

Montero, Maria



This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.


Montero, M. (2017). Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12(3),

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 19, 2017
Publication Date Oct 24, 2017
Deposit Date Jul 20, 2017
Publicly Available Date Oct 24, 2017
Journal Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Print ISSN 1554-0626
Electronic ISSN 1554-0634
Publisher Now Publishers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 12
Issue 3
Keywords legislative bargaining, weighted voting, proportional
Public URL
Publisher URL


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