All Outputs (30)

Monism: the islands of plurality (2016)
Journal Article
Baron, S., & Tallant, J. (2016). Monism: the islands of plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(3), 583-606. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12270

Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are mer... Read More about Monism: the islands of plurality.

Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L., & Tallant, J. (2017). Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(3), 781–803. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064

Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories... Read More about Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better.

The new a-theory of time (2015)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). The new a-theory of time. Inquiry, 58(6), https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1069067

The New A-theory of Time (TNAT) is the view, to be elaborated and defended in this article, that many times exist, and that time is real in virtue of every moment in time bearing each of the so-called A-properties: past, present and future. I argue t... Read More about The new a-theory of time.

Nefarious presentism (2015)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2015). Nefarious presentism. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260), https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095

Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival fact... Read More about Nefarious presentism.

Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world (2015)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world. Philosophical Studies, 172(11), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0459-4

Priority Monism (hereafter, ‘Monism’), as defined by Jonathan Schaffer (Philos Rev 119:131–176, 2010), has a number of components. It is the view that: the cosmos exists; the cosmos is a maximal actual concrete object, of which all actual concrete ob... Read More about Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world.

Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections (2014)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections. Theoria, 81(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12062

Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism. I claim that, by Cameron's own lights, the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby... Read More about Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections.

Immodest and proud (2014)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Immodest and proud. Erkenntnis, 80(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9678-x

In his ‘Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics’, Hofweber (Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 260–289, 2009a) puts forward arguments against positions in metaphysics that he describes as ‘immodest’; a position he identifies as defended... Read More about Immodest and proud.

Metaphysics, intuitions and physics (2014)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Metaphysics, intuitions and physics. Ratio, 28(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12074

Ladyman and Ross (2007) do not think that contemporary metaphysics is in good standing. However, they do think that there is a version of metaphysics that can be made to work – provided we approach it using appropriate principles. My aim in this pape... Read More about Metaphysics, intuitions and physics.

Against mereological nihilism (2013)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2013). Against mereological nihilism. Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0343-8

I argue that mereological nihilism fails because it cannot answer (what I describe as) the special arrangement question: when is it true that the xs (the mereological simples) are arranged F-wise? I suggest that the answers given in the literature fa... Read More about Against mereological nihilism.

Dubious by nature (2013)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2013). Dubious by nature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(1), https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.812372

There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to... Read More about Dubious by nature.