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Nefarious presentism

Tallant, Jonathan; Ingram, David

Authors

David Ingram



Abstract

Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions: ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.

Citation

Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2015). Nefarious presentism. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260), https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Feb 2, 2010
Online Publication Date Feb 25, 2015
Publication Date Jul 1, 2015
Deposit Date Jun 5, 2016
Publicly Available Date Jun 5, 2016
Journal Philosophical Quarterly
Print ISSN 0031-8094
Electronic ISSN 0031-8094
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 65
Issue 260
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095
Keywords Presentism; truth-making; the truth-maker objection to presentism
Public URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/33718
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record Tallant, J. and Ingram, D. (2015). “Nefarious Presentism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 65(260), pp. 355-371 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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