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Dubious by nature

Tallant, Jonathan

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There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable. Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be ‘dubious’, and argue that this too fails. I use Bigelow's (1996) Lucretian properties as a vehicle for the discussions of dubiousness that follow. As a consequence, the paper ends up offering a partial defense of Lucretianism.


Tallant, J. (2013). Dubious by nature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(1),

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jul 16, 2013
Deposit Date Apr 17, 2014
Publicly Available Date Apr 17, 2014
Journal Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Print ISSN 0045-5091
Electronic ISSN 0045-5091
Publisher Routledge
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 43
Issue 1
Keywords Presentism, Lucretianism, Hypothetical properties, Dubious properties, Suspicious properties, Point beyond
Public URL
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