Against mereological nihilism
I argue that mereological nihilism fails because it cannot answer (what I describe as) the special arrangement question: when is it true that the xs (the mereological simples) are arranged F-wise? I suggest that the answers given in the literature fail and that the obvious responses that could be made look to undermine the motivations for adopting nihilism in the first place.
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Publication Date||Sep 1, 2013|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|APA6 Citation||Tallant, J. (2013). Against mereological nihilism. Synthese, doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0343-8|
|Copyright Statement||Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0|
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
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