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All Outputs (287)

Burdens of proof and the case for unevenness (2013)
Journal Article
Aijaz, I., McKeown-Green, J., & Webster, A. (2013). Burdens of proof and the case for unevenness. Argumentation, 27(3), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9285-4

How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue t... Read More about Burdens of proof and the case for unevenness.

Responsibility for implicit bias (2012)
Journal Article
Holroyd, J. (2012). Responsibility for implicit bias. Journal of Social Philosophy, 43(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01565.x

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below th... Read More about Responsibility for implicit bias.

MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS (2012)
Journal Article
SINCLAIR, N. (2012). MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS. Analytic Philosophy, 53(2), 158-179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-960x.2012.00558.x

Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face va... Read More about MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS.

Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements (2012)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2012). Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements. Biology and Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9316-4

This paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion... Read More about Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.

Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions (2012)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2012). Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15(5), 647-659. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9360-9

In this paper I grant the Humean premise that some reasons for action are grounded in the desires of the agents whose reasons they are. I then consider the question of the relation between the reasons and the desires that ground them. According to pr... Read More about Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions.

Do possible worlds compromise God's beauty? A reply to Mark Ian Thomas Robson (2012)
Journal Article
Robson, J. (2012). Do possible worlds compromise God's beauty? A reply to Mark Ian Thomas Robson. Religious Studies, 48(4), 515-532. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412512000042

In a recent article Mark Ian Thomas Robson argues that there is a clear contradiction between the view that possible worlds are a part of God's nature and the theologically pivotal, but philosophically neglected, claim that God is perfectly beautiful... Read More about Do possible worlds compromise God's beauty? A reply to Mark Ian Thomas Robson.

Moral expressivism and sentential negation (2011)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2011). Moral expressivism and sentential negation. Philosophical Studies, 152(3), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9484-5

This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to exp... Read More about Moral expressivism and sentential negation.

Scientific explanation and moral explanation (2011)
Journal Article
Leibowitz, U. D. (2011). Scientific explanation and moral explanation. Noûs, 45(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00775.x

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influenc... Read More about Scientific explanation and moral explanation.

Rationality and the unit of action (2011)
Journal Article
Woodard, C. (2011). Rationality and the unit of action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(2), https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0058-z

This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that... Read More about Rationality and the unit of action.

The retributive emotions: passions and pains of punishment (2010)
Journal Article
Holroyd, J. (2010). The retributive emotions: passions and pains of punishment. Philosophical Papers, 39(3), https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2010.538914

It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which the... Read More about The retributive emotions: passions and pains of punishment.