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The explanationist argument for moral realism

Sinclair, Neil

Authors

Neil Sinclair neil.sinclair@nottingham.ac.uk



Abstract

In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 1, 2011
Journal Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Print ISSN 0045-5091
Electronic ISSN 1911-0820
Publisher Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Peer Reviewed Not Peer Reviewed
Volume 41
Issue 1
APA6 Citation Sinclair, N. (2011). The explanationist argument for moral realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41(1),
Publisher URL http://www.canadianjournalofphilosophy.com
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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