The explanationist argument for moral realism

Sinclair, Neil

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2011). The explanationist argument for moral realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41(1),

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2011
• Deposit Date: Feb 22, 2013
• Publicly Available Date: Feb 22, 2013
• Journal: Canadian Journal of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0045-5091
• Electronic ISSN: 1911-0820
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Not Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 41
• Issue: 1
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1011370
• Publisher URL: http://www.canadianjournalofphilosophy.com