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Expressivism and the Value of Truth

Sinclair, Neil

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Authors

NEIL SINCLAIR neil.sinclair@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Philosophy



Abstract

This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia, 40(4), 877-883. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 8, 2012
Online Publication Date May 16, 2012
Publication Date 2012-12
Deposit Date Feb 22, 2013
Publicly Available Date Feb 22, 2013
Journal Philosophia
Print ISSN 0048-3893
Electronic ISSN 1574-9274
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 40
Issue 4
Pages 877-883
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7
Keywords Philosophy
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1009307
Publisher URL http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-012-9372-7
Additional Information The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com

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