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Expressivism and the value of truth

Sinclair, Neil

Authors



Abstract

This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2012). Expressivism and the value of truth. Philosophia, 40(4), doi:10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 1, 2012
Deposit Date Feb 22, 2013
Publicly Available Date Feb 22, 2013
Journal Philosophia
Print ISSN 0048-3893
Electronic ISSN 1574-9274
Publisher Humana Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 40
Issue 4
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7
Public URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1931
Publisher URL http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-012-9372-7
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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