Expressivism and the Value of Truth

Sinclair, Neil

Abstract

This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia, 40(4), 877-883. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 8, 2012
• Online Publication Date: May 16, 2012
• Publication Date: 2012-12
• Deposit Date: Feb 22, 2013
• Publicly Available Date: Feb 22, 2013
• Journal: Philosophia
• Print ISSN: 0048-3893
• Electronic ISSN: 1574-9274
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 40
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 877-883
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7
• Keywords: Philosophy
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1009307
• Publisher URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-012-9372-7
• Additional Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com