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On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons

Sinclair, Neil

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Authors

NEIL SINCLAIR neil.sinclair@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Philosophy



Abstract

According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams’ claim is compatible with this ‘expansive’ account of what it is to act for a normative reason.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (in press). On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(5), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 29, 2016
Online Publication Date May 8, 2016
Deposit Date May 18, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Print ISSN 1386-2820
Electronic ISSN 1572-8447
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 19
Issue 5
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8
Keywords Action; normative reason; practical deliberation; reasons internalism; Schroeder
Williams
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/790895
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8

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