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Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments

Miller, Luis; Montero, Maria; Vanberg, Christoph

Authors

Luis Miller Luismiguel.miller@ehu.es

Christoph Vanberg vanberg@uni-hd.de



Abstract

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-than-unanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding qualitative support for several, but not all, of our main predictions. Having a high disagreement value is indeed an advantage under unanimity. Under majority, the player with the highest disagreement value is more likely to be excluded, but this does not consistently result in a lower average payoff.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 31, 2018
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Electronic ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 107
APA6 Citation Miller, L., Montero, M., & Vanberg, C. (2018). Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 107, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.003
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.003
Keywords legislative bargaining; majority rule;
unanimity rule; risk of breakdown; experiments
Publisher URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825617301963?via%3Dihub
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0





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