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Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments

Miller, Luis; Montero, Maria; Vanberg, Christoph

Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments Thumbnail


Luis Miller

Christoph Vanberg


We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-than-unanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding qualitative support for several, but not all, of our main predictions. Having a high disagreement value is indeed an advantage under unanimity. Under majority, the player with the highest disagreement value is more likely to be excluded, but this does not consistently result in a lower average payoff.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Nov 13, 2017
Online Publication Date Nov 16, 2017
Publication Date Jan 31, 2018
Deposit Date Jan 3, 2018
Publicly Available Date May 17, 2019
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Electronic ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 107
Keywords legislative bargaining; majority rule;
unanimity rule; risk of breakdown; experiments
Public URL
Publisher URL


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