Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better

Jansson, Lina; Tallant, Jonathan

Abstract

Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration.

Citation

Jansson, L., & Tallant, J. (2017). Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(3), 781–803. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 3, 2015
• Online Publication Date: Feb 22, 2016
• Publication Date: Nov 1, 2017
• Deposit Date: Jun 5, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 5, 2016
• Journal: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
• Print ISSN: 0007-0882
• Electronic ISSN: 1464-3537
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 68
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 781–803
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/775571
• Publisher URL: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/02/22/bjps.axv064
• Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The version of record Br J Philos Sci (2016); doi: 10.1093/bjps/axv064 is available online at: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/02/22/bjps.axv064