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Presentism and representation: saying it without words

Baron, Sam; Miller, Kristie; Tallant, Jonathan

Presentism and representation: saying it without words Thumbnail


Sam Baron

Kristie Miller


The Triviality Argument against presentism maintains that we should reject presentism because there is no way to define the view that is not either trivially true or obviously false. We suggest that this style of argument over-emphasises purely linguistic means of representing a philosophical thesis. We argue that there is no reason to suppose that all philosophical theses must be linguistically representable, and thus that the failure to linguistically represent presentism is no big deal. It certainly shouldn’t lead us to reject the view. We offer a more general moral for philosophy, and that is to look beyond purely linguistic methods of representing philosophical views and embrace a wider range of representational media.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Nov 20, 2022
Online Publication Date Jan 20, 2023
Publication Date 2023-02
Deposit Date Nov 21, 2022
Publicly Available Date Jan 21, 2024
Journal Synthese
Print ISSN 0039-7857
Electronic ISSN 1573-0964
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 201
Issue 2
Article Number 36
Keywords Presentism, Triviality argument, Representation
Public URL
Publisher URL


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