The Tawḥīds of Ibn Taymiyya
(2024)
Book Chapter
All Outputs (38)
The Route to Artificial Phenomenology; ‘Attunement to the World’ and Representationalism of Affective States (2023)
Book Chapter
According to dominant views in affective computing, artificial systems e.g. robots and algorithms cannot experience emotion because they lack the phenomenological aspect associated with emotional experience. In this paper I suggest that if we wish to... Read More about The Route to Artificial Phenomenology; ‘Attunement to the World’ and Representationalism of Affective States.
Guilty Pleas, Sentence Reductions, and Non-punishment of the Innocent (2023)
Book Chapter
Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science (2023)
Book Chapter
Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions (2022)
Book Chapter
The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism (2022)
Book Chapter
In “The Evolutionary Debunking of Quasi-Realism,” Neil Sinclair and James Chamberlain present a novel answer that quasi-realists can pro-vide to a version of the reliability challenge in ethics—which asks for an explanation of why our moral... Read More about The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism.
The First Person and ‘The First Person’ (2022)
Book Chapter
In ‘The First Person’ Anscombe argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression: ‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all. Her no-reference thesis has met with general incredulity. This chapt... Read More about The First Person and ‘The First Person’.
Personal Identity and Morality (2022)
Book Chapter
Does the true account of personal identity undermine everyday moral thinking? Do every day moral practices presuppose a false account of our nature and persistence conditions? I shall consider the three main accounts of personal identity in the conte... Read More about Personal Identity and Morality.
Global Expressivism and the Puzzle of Truth-Apt Sentences (2021)
Book Chapter
The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence (2021)
Book Chapter
In this paper we argue that persons should be defined as being things that are sometimes capable of first-person thought. We then defend an account (the Hybrid Account) of their persistence conditions. According to it psychological continuity and bio... Read More about The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence.
Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob (1848-1925) (2021)
Book Chapter
Can Pragmatism about Quantum Theory Handle Objectivity about Explanations? (2020)
Book Chapter
The problem of reference change (2020)
Book Chapter
Consequentialism and Reasons for Action (2020)
Book Chapter
Consequentialist theories often neglect reasons for action. They offer theories of the rightness or the goodness of actions, or of virtue, but they typically do not include theories of reasons. However, consequentialists can give plausible accounts o... Read More about Consequentialism and Reasons for Action.
Global Expressivism (2020)
Book Chapter
In this chapter I consider the prospects of globalizing expressivism. Expressivism is a position in the philosophy of language that questions the central role of representation in a theory of meaning or linguistic function. An expressivist about a do... Read More about Global Expressivism.
Moral Testimony As Higher-order Evidence (2020)
Book Chapter
Subjective Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Subjective theories of well-being seek to explain what makes something good for a subject in terms of that subject's psychological states. Two ways of distinguishing subjective and non-subjective theories are explained. The main issue dividing subjec... Read More about Subjective Theories of Well-Being.
Hybrid Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Hybrid theories of well-being combine elements of two or more kinds of theory. The most familiar kinds of hybrid combine a subjective requirement (e.g. that a constituent of well-being is enjoyed or desired) with an objective requirement (e.g. that i... Read More about Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.
Against Incapacitative Punishment (2019)
Book Chapter
Epistemological disjunctivism and its representational commitments (2019)
Book Chapter