Does the true account of personal identity undermine everyday moral thinking? Do every day moral practices presuppose a false account of our nature and persistence conditions? I shall consider the three main accounts of personal identity in the contemporary literature: the neo-Lockean psychological continuity account presented paradigmatically by Shoemaker (1963, see also Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984), animalism (as defended by Olson (1997, 2003)), and David Lewis’s perdurance account (1983, 1986). In each case it will be concluded that the account is inconsistent with what we take to be fundamental elements of our moral thought being so.
Noonan, H. (2022). Personal Identity and Morality. In K. Tobia (Ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self (87-97). Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350246928.0011