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Personal Identity and Morality

Noonan, Harold

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Professor of Mind and Cognition


Kevin Tobia


Does the true account of personal identity undermine everyday moral thinking? Do every day moral practices presuppose a false account of our nature and persistence conditions? I shall consider the three main accounts of personal identity in the contemporary literature: the neo-Lockean psychological continuity account presented paradigmatically by Shoemaker (1963, see also Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984), animalism (as defended by Olson (1997, 2003)), and David Lewis’s perdurance account (1983, 1986). In each case it will be concluded that the account is inconsistent with what we take to be fundamental elements of our moral thought being so.


Noonan, H. (2022). Personal Identity and Morality. In K. Tobia (Ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self (87-97). Bloomsbury Publishing.

Acceptance Date Mar 20, 2021
Online Publication Date Jun 28, 2022
Publication Date Jun 28, 2022
Deposit Date Nov 18, 2021
Publicly Available Date Dec 29, 2022
Publisher Bloomsbury Publishing
Pages 87-97
Series Title Advances in Experimental Philosophy
Book Title Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self
Chapter Number 5
ISBN 9781350246898
Public URL
Publisher URL


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