Consequentialism and Reasons for Action

Woodard, Christopher

Abstract

Consequentialist theories often neglect reasons for action. They offer theories of the rightness or the goodness of actions, or of virtue, but they typically do not include theories of reasons. However, consequentialists can give plausible accounts of reasons. This chapter examines some different ways in which such accounts might be developed, focusing on Act Consequentialism and Rule Consequentialism and on the relationship between reasons and rightness. It notes that adding claims about reasons to consequentialist theories may introduce a welcome kind of complexity, and in doing so may help to make consequentialist approaches to ethics more appealing. For example, it may help consequentialists to explain the ideas of moral constraints and moral options.

Citation

Woodard, C. (2020). Consequentialism and Reasons for Action. In D. W. Portmore (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (178-196). Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.31

• Acceptance Date: May 30, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Oct 8, 2020
• Publication Date: 2020
• Deposit Date: Oct 22, 2020
• Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
• Pages: 178-196
• Book Title: The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism
• Chapter Number: 9
• ISBN: 9780190905323
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.31
• Keywords: Reasons, Act Consequentialism, Rule Consequentialism, rightness, moral constraints, moral options
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2113208
• Publisher URL: https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190905323-e-31