All Outputs (26)

Metaethics and the nature of properties (2024)
Journal Article

This paper explores connections between theories of morality and theories of properties. It argues that: (1) Moral realism is in tension with predicate, class and mereological nominalism; (2) Moral non-naturalism is incompatible with standard version... Read More about Metaethics and the nature of properties.

Speculative Aesthetic Expressivism (2022)
Journal Article

In this paper we sketch a new version of aesthetic expressivism. We argue that one advantage of this view is that it explains various putative norms on the formation and revision of aesthetic judgement. We begin by setting out our proposed explananda... Read More about Speculative Aesthetic Expressivism.

The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism (2022)
Book Chapter

In “The Evolutionary Debunking of Quasi-Realism,” Neil Sinclair and James Chamberlain present a novel answer that quasi-realists can pro-vide to a version of the reliability challenge in ethics—which asks for an explanation of why our moral... Read More about The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism.

Practical expressivism (2021)
Book

Morality is a human institution that can be adequately understood as a naturalistically explicable coordination device, whereby human beings work towards, sustain, and refine mutually beneficial patterns of action and reaction. This morality owes not... Read More about Practical expressivism.

Moral Testimony As Higher-order Evidence (2020)
Book Chapter

The Naturalistic Fallacy (2018)
Book

Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology (2018)
Book Chapter

I argue that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective against a range of plausible positions regarding moral truth. I first (§1) distinguish debunking arguments which target the truth of moral judgements from those which target... Read More about Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology.

Evolution and the missing link (in debunking arguments) (2017)
Book Chapter

Reasons Internalism and the function of normative reasons (2017)
Journal Article

What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism there is a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attrac... Read More about Reasons Internalism and the function of normative reasons.

Conceptual role semantics and the reference of moral concepts (2017)
Journal Article

© 2017 The Authors European Journal of Philosophy Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd This paper examines the prospects for a conceptual or functional role theory of moral concepts. It is argued that such an account is well-placed to explain both th... Read More about Conceptual role semantics and the reference of moral concepts.

On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons (2016)
Journal Article

According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has... Read More about On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons.

Reasons, inescapability and persuasion (2016)
Journal Article

This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how the reasons thus stated can be inescapable. The motivation for the theory is in part that it can explain this and other phenomena concerning moral rea... Read More about Reasons, inescapability and persuasion.

Explanation in ethics and mathematics (2016)
Book

On standing one's ground (2014)
Journal Article

I provide a positive expressivist account of the permissibility of ‘standing one’s ground’ in some cases of moral conflict, based in part on an illustrative analogy with political disputes. This account suffices to undermine Enoch’s recent argument a... Read More about On standing one's ground.

MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS (2012)
Journal Article

Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face va... Read More about MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS.

Expressivism and the Value of Truth (2012)
Journal Article

This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an '... Read More about Expressivism and the Value of Truth.

Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements (2012)
Journal Article

This paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion... Read More about Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.

Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions (2012)
Journal Article

In this paper I grant the Humean premise that some reasons for action are grounded in the desires of the agents whose reasons they are. I then consider the question of the relation between the reasons and the desires that ground them. According to pr... Read More about Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions.

Expressivist Explanations (2012)
Journal Article

In this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivativ... Read More about Expressivist Explanations.

Moral expressivism and sentential negation (2011)
Journal Article

This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to exp... Read More about Moral expressivism and sentential negation.