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Outputs (29)

Presentism and representation: saying it without words (2023)
Journal Article
Baron, S., Miller, K., & Tallant, J. (2023). Presentism and representation: saying it without words. Synthese, 201(2), Article 36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03987-2

The Triviality Argument against presentism maintains that we should reject presentism because there is no way to define the view that is not either trivially true or obviously false. We suggest that this style of argument over-emphasises purely lingu... Read More about Presentism and representation: saying it without words.

A Defence of Lucretian Presentism (2020)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2020). A Defence of Lucretian Presentism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), 675-690. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697709

© 2019 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. In this paper, we defend Lucretian Presentism (‘Lucretianism’). Although the view faces many objections and has proven unpopular with presentists, we rehabilitate Lucretianism and argue that none of the obje... Read More about A Defence of Lucretian Presentism.

Might Teaching Be Judgement Dependent? (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Fisher, A. (2020). Might Teaching Be Judgement Dependent?. Philosophia, 48, 777–787. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00130-3

Our thesis in this paper is that consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgement-dependent leads us to the conclusion that teaching is judgement dependent. We begin with a consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgemen... Read More about Might Teaching Be Judgement Dependent?.

Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World (2019)
Journal Article
Baron, S., Miller, K., & Tallant, J. (2021). Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(2), 281-301. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12637

Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravi... Read More about Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World.

Trust: from the Philosophical to the Commercial (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Donati, D. (2020). Trust: from the Philosophical to the Commercial. Philosophy of Management, 19(1), 3-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40926-019-00107-y

© 2019, The Author(s). This is a paper about trust, with a specific focus on the ways in which trust is investigated in the business literature and the commercial sector. The lens through which the topic is approached is distinctively philosophical.... Read More about Trust: from the Philosophical to the Commercial.

You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2019). You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t. Theoria, 85(2), 102-118. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12177

My claim in this paper is that, contra what I take to be the orthodoxy in the wider literature, we do trust inanimate objects—per the example in the title, there are cases where people really do trust a ladder (to hold their weight, for instance), an... Read More about You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t.

It's one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them (2018)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Baron, S. (2021). It's one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them. Synthese, 198(1), 105-115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01983-z

In this paper we offer a response to one argument in favour of Priority Monism, what Jonathan Schaffer calls the nomic argument for monism. We proceed in three stages. We begin by introducing Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism and the nomic argument... Read More about It's one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them.

An error in temporal error theory (2018)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2018). An error in temporal error theory. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(1), 14-32. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.5

Within the philosophy of time there has been a growing interest in positions that deny the reality of time. Those positions, whether motivated by arguments from physics or metaphysics, have a shared conclusion: time is not real. What has not been mad... Read More about An error in temporal error theory.

Commitment in cases of trust and distrust (2017)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2017). Commitment in cases of trust and distrust. Thought: Fordham University Quarterly, 6(4), https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.259

There is a well-developed literature on trust. Distrust, on the other hand, has gathered far less attention in the philosophical literature (though there is a burgeoning business literature on the topic). A recent exception to that trend in the philo... Read More about Commitment in cases of trust and distrust.

Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument (2016)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2016). Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument. Manuscrito, 39(4), https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045

Dynamic theories of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”. In this paper I develop a version of the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument in order to show that time does not pass, but that this is no threat to dynamic theories of time... Read More about Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument.

Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity (2016)
Journal Article
Baron, S., & Tallant, J. (2018). Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(3), 596-619. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12337

Ockham’s razor asks that we not multiply entities beyond necessity. The razor is a powerful methodological tool, enabling us to articulate reasons for preferring one theory to another. There are those, however, who would modify the razor. Schaffer (2... Read More about Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity.

Monism: the islands of plurality (2016)
Journal Article
Baron, S., & Tallant, J. (2016). Monism: the islands of plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(3), 583-606. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12270

Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are mer... Read More about Monism: the islands of plurality.

Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L., & Tallant, J. (2017). Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(3), 781–803. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064

Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories... Read More about Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better.

Nefarious presentism (2015)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2015). Nefarious presentism. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260), https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095

Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival fact... Read More about Nefarious presentism.

Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world (2015)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world. Philosophical Studies, 172(11), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0459-4

Priority Monism (hereafter, ‘Monism’), as defined by Jonathan Schaffer (Philos Rev 119:131–176, 2010), has a number of components. It is the view that: the cosmos exists; the cosmos is a maximal actual concrete object, of which all actual concrete ob... Read More about Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world.

Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections (2014)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections. Theoria, 81(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12062

Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism. I claim that, by Cameron's own lights, the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby... Read More about Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections.