All Outputs (4)

Consequentialism and Reasons for Action (2020)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2020). Consequentialism and Reasons for Action. In D. W. Portmore (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (178-196). Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.31

Consequentialist theories often neglect reasons for action. They offer theories of the rightness or the goodness of actions, or of virtue, but they typically do not include theories of reasons. However, consequentialists can give plausible accounts o... Read More about Consequentialism and Reasons for Action.

Hybrid Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2019). Hybrid Theories of Well-Being. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee894

Hybrid theories of well-being combine elements of two or more kinds of theory. The most familiar kinds of hybrid combine a subjective requirement (e.g. that a constituent of well-being is enjoyed or desired) with an objective requirement (e.g. that i... Read More about Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.

Subjective Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2019). Subjective Theories of Well-Being. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1-8). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee927

Subjective theories of well-being seek to explain what makes something good for a subject in terms of that subject's psychological states. Two ways of distinguishing subjective and non-subjective theories are explained. The main issue dividing subjec... Read More about Subjective Theories of Well-Being.

Hybrid theories (2015)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2015). Hybrid theories. In G. Fletcher (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of philosophy of well-being. Routledge