Preferences and Perceptions in Provision and Maintenance Public Goods

Gächter, Simon; Kölle, Felix; Quercia, Simone

Abstract

We study two generic versions of public goods problems: in Provision problems, the public good does not exist initially and needs to be provided; in Maintenance problems, the public good already exists and needs to be maintained. In four lab and online experiments (,105), we document a robust asymmetry in preferences and perceptions in two incentive-equivalent versions of these public good problems. We find fewer conditional cooperators and more free riders in Maintenance than Provision, a difference that is replicable, stable, and reflected in perceptions of kindness. Incentivized control questions administered before gameplay reveal dilemma-specific misperceptions but controlling for them neither eliminates game-dependent conditional cooperation, nor differences in perceived kindness of others' cooperation. Thus, even when sharing the same game form, Maintenance and Provision are different social dilemmas that require separate behavioral analyses.

Citation

Gächter, S., Kölle, F., & Quercia, S. (2022). Preferences and Perceptions in Provision and Maintenance Public Goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 135, 338-355. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.009

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 29, 2022
• Online Publication Date: Jul 15, 2022
• Publication Date: 2022-09
• Deposit Date: Jul 20, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 21, 2022
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Print ISSN: 0899-8256
• Electronic ISSN: 1090-2473
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 135
• Pages: 338-355
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.009
• Keywords: Economics and Econometrics; Finance
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/8955910
• Publisher URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622001087?via%3Dihub