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The role of payoff parameters for cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Gächter, Simon; Lee, Kyeongtae; Sefton, Martin; Weber, Till O.

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Authors

Kyeongtae Lee

Till O. Weber



Contributors

Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma is arguably the most important model of social dilemmas, but our knowledge about how its material payoff structure affects cooperation is incomplete. We investigate the effect of variation in material payoffs on cooperation in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games. We report results from three experiments (N = 1,993): in a preliminary experiment, we vary the payoffs over a large range. In our first main experiment (Study 1), we present a novel design that varies payoffs orthogonally in a within-subjects design. Our second main experiment, Study 2, investigates the orthogonal variation of payoffs in a between-subjects design. In a complementary analysis we also study the closely related payoff indices of normalized loss and gain, and the K-index. A robust finding of our experiments is that cooperation increases with the gains of mutual cooperation over mutual defection.

Citation

Gächter, S., Lee, K., Sefton, M., & Weber, T. O. (2024). The role of payoff parameters for cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. European Economic Review, 166, Article 104753. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104753

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 8, 2024
Online Publication Date May 9, 2024
Publication Date Jul 1, 2024
Deposit Date May 17, 2024
Publicly Available Date May 20, 2024
Journal European Economic Review
Print ISSN 0014-2921
Electronic ISSN 1873-572X
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 166
Article Number 104753
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104753
Keywords Prisoner's Dilemma; Cooperation; Payoff parameters; Temptation; Risk; Efficiency; Normalized gain; Normalized loss; K-index; Experiments
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/34871753
Publisher URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124000825?via%3Dihub

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