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Social closeness can help, harm and be irrelevant in solving pure coordination problems

Gächter, Simon; Starmer, Chris; Thöni, Christian; Tufano, Fabio; Weber, Till O.

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Authors

SIMON GAECHTER simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor, Psychology of Economic Decision Making

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CHRIS STARMER chris.starmer@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Experimental Economics

Christian Thöni

Fabio Tufano

Till O. Weber



Abstract

Experimental research has shown that ordinary people often perform remarkably well in solving coordination games that involve no conflicts of interest. While most experiments in the past studied such coordination games among socially distant anonymous players, here we study behaviour in a set of two player coordination games and compare the outcomes depending on whether the players are socially close or socially distant. We find that social closeness influences prospects for coordination, but whether it helps, harms, or has no impact on coordination probabilities, depends on the structure of the game.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 21, 2022
Online Publication Date May 4, 2022
Publication Date May 30, 2022
Deposit Date May 19, 2022
Publicly Available Date May 19, 2022
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier BV
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 216
Article Number 110552
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110552
Keywords Economics and Econometrics; Finance
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/7956885
Publisher URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176522001562?via%3Dihub

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