Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Is the free market acceptable to everyone?

Clayton, Matthew; Stevens, David

Is the free market acceptable to everyone? Thumbnail


Authors

Matthew Clayton



Abstract

In this paper we take issue with two central claims that John Tomasi makes in Free Market Fairness (2012). The first claim is that Rawls’s difference principle can better be realized by free market institutions than it can be by state interventionist regimes such as property-owning democracy or liberal socialism. We argue that Tomasi’s narrow interpretation of the difference principle, which focuses largely on wealth and income, leaves other goods (such as control of the workplace and access to economic assets) worryingly unsatisfied. The second claim is that a wide set of economic liberties ought to be protected because they realize responsible ‘self-authorship.’ We argue that this claim also fails because, crucially, whether economic liberties serve individuals in pursuing their ambitions will depend on the nature of those ambitions and how the use of those liberties by others would affect their pursuit of them. If an expansion of liberty is good for us in some ways, but bad in others, we need to assess whether, all things considered, we would be better off with or without such expanded economic rights. We argue that the expansion Tomasi proposes is likely to fail this test.

Citation

Clayton, M., & Stevens, D. (in press). Is the free market acceptable to everyone?. Res Publica, 21(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-015-9298-6

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 17, 2015
Online Publication Date Nov 19, 2015
Deposit Date Sep 27, 2016
Publicly Available Date Sep 27, 2016
Journal Res Publica
Electronic ISSN 1572-8692
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 21
Issue 4
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-015-9298-6
Keywords Tomasi, Equality, Difference principle, Self-respect, Liberty
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/766206
Publisher URL http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11158-015-9298-6

Files





You might also like



Downloadable Citations