All Outputs (3)

The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason (2018)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. J. (2019). The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason. Philosophical Quarterly, 69(275), 235-257. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy019

We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets... Read More about The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason.

Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons (2018)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. (2020). Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons. Erkenntnis, 85(3), 673-692. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0043-3

Jennifer Hornsby has defended the Reasons-Knowledge Thesis (RKT): the claim that Φ -ing because p requires knowing that p, where the ‘because’ at issue is a rationalising ‘because’. She defends (RKT) by appeal to the thought that it provides the best... Read More about Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons.

Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception? (2018)
Book Chapter
Cunningham, J. J. (2018). Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?. In J. Gersel, R. Thybo Jensen, M. S. Thaning, & S. Overgaard (Eds.), In the light of experience: New essays on perception and reasons (256-280). Oxford University Press (OUP)

This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to elaborate (TMV), elements of which can be found in the w... Read More about Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?.