All Outputs (3)

Calendar mechanisms (2017)
Journal Article

I study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a monopolist selling a fixed number of service slots to randomly arriving, short-lived buyers with heterogeneous values. The fully optimal mechanism is a non-standard auction in which bidders' payoffs a... Read More about Calendar mechanisms.

On the Impossibility of Protecting Risk?takers (2017)
Journal Article

Risk?neutral sellers can extract high profits from risk?loving buyers using lotteries. To limit risk?taking, gambling is heavily regulated in most countries. In this article, I show that protecting risk?loving buyers is essentially impossible. Even i... Read More about On the Impossibility of Protecting Risk?takers.

Overbooking (2017)
Journal Article

We consider optimal pricing policies for airlines when passengers are uncertain at the time of ticketing of their eventual willingness to pay for air travel. Auctions at the time of departure efficiently allocate space and a profit maximizing airline... Read More about Overbooking.