All Outputs (2)

Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox (2023)
Book Chapter
Montero, M. (2023). Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox. In S. Kurz, N. Maaser, & A. Mayer (Eds.), Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century (159-171). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10

It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalitio... Read More about Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox.

Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting (2014)
Book Chapter
Montero, M. (in press). Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting. In Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1

This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilib... Read More about Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting.