A Change of Perspective: Naive Realism and Normal Variation
(2025)
Book Chapter
FRENCH, C., & PHILLIPS, I. (2025). A Change of Perspective: Naive Realism and Normal Variation. In O. Beck, & F. Masrour (Eds.), The Relational View of Perception: New Philosophical Essays (154-182). Routledge
All Outputs (19)
Mental health pluralism (2024)
Journal Article
French, C. (2025). Mental health pluralism. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 28, 65-81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10233-8In addressing the question of what mental health is we might proceed as if there is a single phenomenon—mental health—denoted by a single overarching concept. The task, then, is to provide an informative analysis of this concept which applies to all... Read More about Mental health pluralism.
On the Myth of Psychotherapy (2024)
Journal Article
French, C. (in press). On the Myth of Psychotherapy. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology,Thomas Szasz famously argued that mental illness is a myth. Less famously, Szasz argued that since mental illness is a myth, so too is psychotherapy. Szasz’ claim that mental illness is a myth has been much discussed, but much less attention has been... Read More about On the Myth of Psychotherapy.
On The Myth of Psychotherapy * (2024)
Journal Article
French, C. (in press). On The Myth of Psychotherapy *. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology,Thomas Szasz famously argued that mental illness is a myth. Less famously, Szasz argued that since mental illness is a myth, so too is psychotherapy. Szasz' claim that mental illness is a myth has been much discussed, but much less attention has been... Read More about On The Myth of Psychotherapy *.
Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science (2023)
Book Chapter
French, C., & Phillips, I. (2023). Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science. In B. P. McLaughlin, & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (363-383). (2nd). Wiley-Blackwell
Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science (2023)
Book Chapter
French, C., & Phillips, I. (2023). Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science. In B. P. McLaughlin, & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. (Second Edition). Wiley
Naive realism, representationalism, and the rationalizing role of visual perception (2020)
Journal Article
French, C. (2020). Naive realism, representationalism, and the rationalizing role of visual perception. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), 102-119. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12174
Austerity and Illusion (2020)
Journal Article
French, C., & Phillips, I. (2020). Austerity and Illusion. Philosophers' Imprint, 20(15), 1-19Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes an... Read More about Austerity and Illusion.
The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg (2019)
Journal Article
French, C. (2020). The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg. Mind, 129(513), 339-349. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz026
Epistemological disjunctivism and its representational commitments (2019)
Book Chapter
French, C. (2019). Epistemological disjunctivism and its representational commitments. In C. Doyle, J. Milburn, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge
How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience (2018)
Journal Article
French, C., & Gomes, A. (2019). How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience. Philosophical Quarterly, 69(274), 41–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy047Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it–that particular object –looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object,... Read More about How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience.
The invalidity of the argument from illusion (2018)
Journal Article
French, C., & Walters, L. (2018). The invalidity of the argument from illusion. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(4), 357-364The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowl... Read More about The invalidity of the argument from illusion.
Object Seeing and Spatial Perception (2018)
Book Chapter
French, C. (2018). Object Seeing and Spatial Perception. In F. Macpherson, & F. Dorsch (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0006This chapter considers the Spatiality Claim: if one sees an object then one sees some of that object’s spatial properties. The author considers an argument for this given by Cassam (2007), and challenges Cassam’s argument. His argument involves the i... Read More about Object Seeing and Spatial Perception.
Naïve realism and diaphaneity (2018)
Journal Article
French, C. (2018). Naïve realism and diaphaneity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(2), 149-175. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual ex... Read More about Naïve realism and diaphaneity.
Bálint's syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception (2018)
Journal Article
French, C. (in press). Bálint's syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception. Mind and Language, https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12187Ordinary cases of object seeing involve the visual perception of space and spatial location. But does seeing an object require such spatial perception? An empirical challenge to the idea that it does comes from reflection upon Bálint's syndrome, for... Read More about Bálint's syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception.
Idiosyncratic Perception (2015)
Journal Article
French, C. (2016). Idiosyncratic Perception. Philosophical Quarterly, 66(3), 391–399. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv068Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyn... Read More about Idiosyncratic Perception.
On the particularity of experience (2015)
Journal Article
French, C., & Gomes, A. (2016). On the particularity of experience. Philosophical Studies, 173(2), 451–460. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0501-6
Naive realist perspectives on seeing blurrily (2014)
Journal Article
French, C. (2014). Naive realist perspectives on seeing blurrily. Ratio, 27(4), 393-413. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12079Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms
of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects
of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of
the world themselves shape the contours of conscious... Read More about Naive realist perspectives on seeing blurrily.
The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism (2014)
Journal Article
French, C. (2016). The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1), 86-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12105I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does t... Read More about The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism.