Research Repository

See what's under the surface

The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism

French, Craig


Craig French


I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternati ve formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed than standard formulations are in the metaphysics of perception.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 11, 2016
Journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Print ISSN 0031-8205
Electronic ISSN 1933-1592
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 92
Issue 1
Publisher URL
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Craig French, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. 92, no. 1, p. 86-104, which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/phpr.12105. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.


French C - Final Draft - The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism1.pdf (201 Kb)

AM - Accepted Manuscript

Downloadable Citations