The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism

French, Craig

Abstract

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternati ve formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed than standard formulations are in the metaphysics of perception.

Citation

French, C. (2016). The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1), 86-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12105

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 1, 2014
• Online Publication Date: Apr 22, 2014
• Publication Date: Jan 11, 2016
• Deposit Date: May 31, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: May 31, 2018
• Journal: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
• Print ISSN: 0031-8205
• Electronic ISSN: 1933-1592
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 92
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 86-104
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12105
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/773129
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phpr.12105
• Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Craig French, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. 92, no. 1, p. 86-104, which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/phpr.12105. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.