CRAIG FRENCH CRAIG.FRENCH@NOTTINGHAM.AC.UK
Associate Professor
Object Seeing and Spatial Perception
French, Craig
Authors
Contributors
Fiona Macpherson
Editor
Fabian Dorsch
Editor
Abstract
This chapter considers the Spatiality Claim: if one sees an object then one sees some of that object’s spatial properties. The author considers an argument for this given by Cassam (2007), and challenges Cassam’s argument. His argument involves the idea, inspired by Dretske (1969), that seeing an object requires visual differentiation. But, it is argued here, there are prima facie counter-examples to the visual differentiation condition. Next, the author discusses the Spatiality Claim directly, and defends it against potential counter-examples which come from reflection on empirical cases where subjects can see objects yet have some sort of spatial perception deficit. One theme that emerges is that insofar as versions of the Spatiality Claim are defensible, we should focus on the relatively determinable spatial properties of objects and our perception of such properties.
Citation
French, C. (2018). Object Seeing and Spatial Perception. In F. Macpherson, & F. Dorsch (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0006
Acceptance Date | Oct 23, 2016 |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | Jun 21, 2018 |
Publication Date | 2018-06 |
Deposit Date | Dec 1, 2016 |
Publicly Available Date | Jun 22, 2020 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Book Title | Phenomenal Presence |
Chapter Number | 6 |
ISBN | 9780199666416 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0006 |
Keywords | spatial perception; seeing; determinable properties; visual differentiation; spatial properties |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/939848 |
Publisher URL | https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780199666416.001.0001/oso-9780199666416-chapter-6 |
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