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Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size

Nosenzo, Daniele; Quercia, Simone; Sefton, Martin

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Authors

Daniele Nosenzo

Simone Quercia



Abstract

We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments, we study four- and eight-person groups in high and low marginal per capita return (MPCR) conditions. We find a positive effect of group size in the low MPCR condition, as in previous experiments. However, in the high MPCR condition we observe a negative group size effect. We extend the design to investigate two- and three-person groups in the high MPCR condition, and find that cooperation is highest of all in two-person groups. The findings in the high MPCR condition are consistent with those from n-person prisoner’s dilemma and oligopoly experiments that suggest it is more difficult to sustain cooperation in larger groups. The findings from the low MPCR condition suggest that this effect can be overridden. In particular, when cooperation is low other factors, such as considerations of the social benefits of contributing (which increase with group size), may dominate any negative group size effect.

Citation

Nosenzo, D., Quercia, S., & Sefton, M. (2015). Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size. Experimental Economics, 18(1), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Oct 28, 2013
Online Publication Date Nov 9, 2013
Publication Date Mar 1, 2015
Deposit Date Sep 12, 2017
Publicly Available Date Sep 12, 2017
Journal Experimental Economics
Print ISSN 1386-4157
Electronic ISSN 1573-6938
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 18
Issue 1
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8
Keywords Voluntary contribution mechanism, Cooperation, Group size
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/984783
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10683-013-9382-8
Contract Date Sep 12, 2017

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