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Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment

Possajennikov, Alex

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Abstract

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders' types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers' strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about the prior distribution of types are updated slower than posterior beliefs, which incorporate Senders' strategies. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play in this game.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date May 1, 2018
Journal Theory and Decision
Print ISSN 0040-5833
Electronic ISSN 1573-7187
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 84
Issue 3
APA6 Citation Possajennikov, A. (2018). Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment. Theory and Decision, 84(3), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9614-z
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9614-z
Keywords Beliefs, Signaling, Experiment, Learning, Belief elicitation
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11238-017-9614-z
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9614-z

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Copyright Statement
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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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