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Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests

Possajennikov, Alex

Authors

Alex Possajennikov alex.possajennikov@nottingham.ac.uk



Contributors

Wolfgang Buchholz
Editor

Dirk Ruebbelke
Editor

Abstract

In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own strategy. The players play an equilibrium given their conjectures, and evolution selects conjectures that lead to a higher payoff in such an equilibrium. Considering one player role, I show that for any conjectures of the other players, only conjectures that are consistent can be evolutionarily stable, where consistency means that the conjecture is, to a first approximation, correct at equilibrium. I illustrate this result in public good games and contests.

Publication Date Mar 20, 2017
Peer Reviewed Not Peer Reviewed
Book Title The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes
APA6 Citation Possajennikov, A. (2017). Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests. In W. Buchholz, & D. Ruebbelke (Eds.), The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. CornesSpringer
Publisher URL http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_5
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
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