Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests

Possajennikov, Alex

Abstract

In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own strategy. The players play an equilibrium given their conjectures, and evolution selects conjectures that lead to a higher payoff in such an equilibrium. Considering one player role, I show that for any conjectures of the other players, only conjectures that are consistent can be evolutionarily stable, where consistency means that the conjecture is, to a first approximation, correct at equilibrium. I illustrate this result in public good games and contests.

Citation

Possajennikov, A. (2017). Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests. In W. Buchholz, & D. Ruebbelke (Eds.), The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes (85-105). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_5

• Acceptance Date: Jul 20, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Mar 21, 2017
• Publication Date: Mar 20, 2017
• Deposit Date: Apr 7, 2017
• Peer Reviewed: Not Peer Reviewed
• Pages: 85-105
• Book Title: The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes
• ISBN: 978-3-319-49441-8
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_5
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/851584
• Publisher URL: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_5