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Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests

Possajennikov, Alex

Authors



Contributors

Wolfgang Buchholz
Editor

Dirk Ruebbelke
Editor

Abstract

In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own strategy. The players play an equilibrium given their conjectures, and evolution selects conjectures that lead to a higher payoff in such an equilibrium. Considering one player role, I show that for any conjectures of the other players, only conjectures that are consistent can be evolutionarily stable, where consistency means that the conjecture is, to a first approximation, correct at equilibrium. I illustrate this result in public good games and contests.

Citation

Possajennikov, A. (2017). Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests. In W. Buchholz, & D. Ruebbelke (Eds.), The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes. Springer

Acceptance Date Jul 20, 2016
Publication Date Mar 20, 2017
Deposit Date Apr 7, 2017
Peer Reviewed Not Peer Reviewed
Book Title The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/851584
Publisher URL http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_5