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Teams promise but do not deliver

Nielsen, Kirby; Bhattacharya, Puja; Kagel, John H.; Sengupta, Arjun

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Authors

Kirby Nielsen

Puja Bhattacharya

John H. Kagel



Abstract

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden-action trust game with pre-play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates, but this does not extend to teams. While teams promise to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for team behavior. We rule out explanations hypothesizing that concern for partner's payoff drives team outcomes, as absent within-team communication, promise fulfillment rates increase compared to individuals. Rather, the results are consistent with the idea that communication between teammates provides support for self-serving behavior.

Citation

Nielsen, K., Bhattacharya, P., Kagel, J. H., & Sengupta, A. (2019). Teams promise but do not deliver. Games and Economic Behavior, 117, 420-432. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.013

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 29, 2019
Online Publication Date Aug 12, 2019
Publication Date Sep 1, 2019
Deposit Date Apr 11, 2022
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Electronic ISSN 1090-2473
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 117
Pages 420-432
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.013
Keywords trust game; hidden-action; non-binding communication; teams versus individuals JEL classification: C72; C91; C92; D83
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/7754978
Publisher URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619301113?via%3Dihub
Additional Information This article is maintained by: Elsevier; Article Title: Teams promise but do not deliver; Journal Title: Games and Economic Behavior; CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.013

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