Timing of Communication

Bhattacharya, Puja; Nielsen, Kirby; Sengupta, Arjun

Abstract

Using an experiment, we demonstrate that a communication regime where a worker communicates about his intended effort is less effective in i) soliciting truthful information, and ii) motivating effort, than a regime where he communicates about his past effort. Our experiment uses a real-effort task, which additionally allows us to demonstrate the effects of communication on effort over time. We show that the timing of communication affects the dynamic pattern of work. In both treatments, individuals are most cooperative closest to the time of communication. Our results reveal that the timing of communication is a critical feature that merits attention in the design of mechanisms for information transmission in strategic settings. JEL: C72, C91, D83 Keywords: cheap talk, asymmetric information, lying Across a wide range of settings, agents take actions which are not observable by their strategic counterparts. In these situations, the interacting parties often communicate to overcome the informational asymmetry that results from hidden action. Over the last decade, a large literature has analyzed these environments focusing on the effect of pre-play communication on static choices. These papers have established that statements of intent or non-binding promises can be informative and increase cooperation in social dilemmas (

Citation

Bhattacharya, P., Nielsen, K., & Sengupta, A. (2020). Timing of Communication. Economic Journal, 130(630), 1623-1649. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa042

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 26, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Apr 14, 2020
• Publication Date: Aug 1, 2020
• Deposit Date: Apr 11, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 15, 2022
• Journal: The Economic Journal
• Print ISSN: 0013-0133
• Electronic ISSN: 1468-0297
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 130
• Issue: 630
• Pages: 1623-1649
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa042
• Keywords: Economics and Econometrics
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/7754939
• Publisher URL: https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/130/630/1623/5819953?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false