Teams promise but do not deliver

Nielsen, Kirby; Bhattacharya, Puja; Kagel, John H.; Sengupta, Arjun

Abstract

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden-action trust game with pre-play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates, but this does not extend to teams. While teams promise to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for team behavior. We rule out explanations hypothesizing that concern for partner's payoff drives team outcomes, as absent within-team communication, promise fulfillment rates increase compared to individuals. Rather, the results are consistent with the idea that communication between teammates provides support for self-serving behavior.

Citation

Nielsen, K., Bhattacharya, P., Kagel, J. H., & Sengupta, A. (2019). Teams promise but do not deliver. Games and Economic Behavior, 117, 420-432. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.013

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 29, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Aug 12, 2019
• Publication Date: Sep 1, 2019
• Deposit Date: Apr 11, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 11, 2022
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Print ISSN: 0899-8256
• Electronic ISSN: 1090-2473
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 117
• Pages: 420-432
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.013
• Keywords: trust game; hidden-action; non-binding communication; teams versus individuals JEL classification: C72; C91; C92; D83
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/7754978
• Publisher URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619301113?via%3Dihub
• Additional Information: This article is maintained by: Elsevier; Article Title: Teams promise but do not deliver; Journal Title: Games and Economic Behavior; CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.013