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Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective

Possajennikov, Alex

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Abstract

Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be evolutionarily stable in an infinite population, where a conjecture is consistent if it is equal to the marginal change in the aggregate determined by the actual best responses. In the finite population case, only zero conjectures representing aggregate-taking behavior can be evolutionarily stable.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Aug 6, 2015
Journal Mathematical Social Sciences
Print ISSN 0165-4896
Electronic ISSN 0165-4896
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 77
APA6 Citation Possajennikov, A. (2015). Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective. Mathematical Social Sciences, 77, doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.07.003
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.07.003
Keywords conjectural variations, aggregative games, indirect evolution, evolutionary stability
Publisher URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489615000670
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0





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