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Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective

Possajennikov, Alex



Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be evolutionarily stable in an infinite population, where a conjecture is consistent if it is equal to the marginal change in the aggregate determined by the actual best responses. In the finite population case, only zero conjectures representing aggregate-taking behavior can be evolutionarily stable.


Possajennikov, A. (2015). Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective. Mathematical Social Sciences, 77,

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Aug 6, 2015
Deposit Date Aug 7, 2015
Publicly Available Date Aug 7, 2015
Journal Mathematical Social Sciences
Print ISSN 0165-4896
Electronic ISSN 0165-4896
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 77
Keywords conjectural variations, aggregative games, indirect evolution, evolutionary stability
Public URL
Publisher URL


AggConjMSSFinalRep.pdf (299 Kb)

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