Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders
Erkut, Hande; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin
MARTIN SEFTON MARTIN.SEFTON@NOTTINGHAM.AC.UK
Professor of Economics
We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.
Erkut, H., Nosenzo, D., & Sefton, M. (2015). Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders. Economics Letters, 130, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Publication Date||Feb 25, 2015|
|Deposit Date||Sep 3, 2015|
|Publicly Available Date||Sep 3, 2015|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|Keywords||Social norms; Dictator games; Norm elicitation|
|Copyright Statement||Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0|
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
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