Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders

Erkut, Hande; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin

Abstract

We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.

Citation

Erkut, H., Nosenzo, D., & Sefton, M. (2015). Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders. Economics Letters, 130, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Feb 25, 2015
• Deposit Date: Sep 3, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 3, 2015
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Electronic ISSN: 1873-7374
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 130
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021
• Keywords: Social norms; Dictator games; Norm elicitation
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/744422
• Publisher URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515000737#