Interaction, protection and epidemics

Goyal, Sanjeev; Vigier, Adrien

Abstract

© 2015. Individuals respond to the risk of contagious infections by restricting interaction and by investing in protection. We develop a model that examines the trade-off between these two actions and the consequences for infection rates.There exists a unique equilibrium: individuals who invest in protection choose to interact more relative to those who do not invest in protection. Changes in the contagiousness of the disease have non-monotonic effects: as a result interaction initially falls and then rises, while infection rates too may initial increase and then decline.We then consider a society with two communities that differ in their returns from interaction - High and Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate of protection and interaction, and a lower rate of infection. Integration amplifies these differences.

Citation

Goyal, S., & Vigier, A. (2015). Interaction, protection and epidemics. Journal of Public Economics, 125, 64-69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.02.010

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 24, 2015
• Online Publication Date: Mar 6, 2015
• Publication Date: May 1, 2015
• Deposit Date: Sep 22, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 22, 2020
• Journal: Journal of Public Economics
• Print ISSN: 0047-2727
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 125
• Pages: 64-69
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.02.010
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4920372
• Publisher URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272715000328?via%3Dihub