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Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information

Bizzotto, Jacopo; R�diger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien

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Authors

Jacopo Bizzotto

Jesper R�diger



Abstract

A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous outside information is the agent's only source of information, and examine the welfare implications of our analysis.

Citation

Bizzotto, J., Rüdiger, J., & Vigier, A. (2021). Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13(1), 179-194. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180141

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 1, 2020
Publication Date 2021-02
Deposit Date Sep 23, 2020
Publicly Available Date Sep 23, 2020
Journal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Print ISSN 1945-7669
Electronic ISSN 1945-7685
Publisher American Economic Association
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 13
Issue 1
Pages 179-194
DOI https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180141
Keywords Information Design; Bayesian Persuasion; Dynamic Games
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4921107
Publisher URL https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20180141&&from=f

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