Distortions of incentive to performance and reduction of motivation in the federal public service in Brazil

Corr�a, Izabela; Cam�es, Marizaura; Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik; Mikkelsen, Kim; Schuster, Christian

Abstract

In the current structure of careers in the Brazilian Federal Government, public officials who do not hold a DAS position have two predominant ways of reaching a higher salary level: years of service and passing a written examination for a higher paid public service career. We argue in this paper that these pathways affect in a negative way public service motivation. First, they shift incentives of early career public officials from job performance towards preparing for higher paid career exams, while depriving officials in middle and later stages of their careers of any advancement opportunities. They also cause salary inequity between careers, demotivating officials with similar responsibilities in lower paid careers. Through statistical analyses of data from an original survey with 2,800 public servants in 14 federal government institutions in Brazil, our findings point to the importance of reducing incentive distortions in Brazil’s public service.

Citation

Corrêa, I., Camões, M., Meyer-Sahling, J.-H., Mikkelsen, K., & Schuster, C. (2020). Distortions of incentive to performance and reduction of motivation in the federal public service in Brazil. Revista de Saúde Pública, 71(3), 476-503. https://doi.org/10.21874/rsp.v71i3.3408

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Aug 3, 2020
• Online Publication Date: Sep 29, 2020
• Publication Date: Sep 29, 2020
• Deposit Date: Sep 4, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 29, 2020
• Journal: Revista de Saúde Pública
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 71
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 476-503
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.21874/rsp.v71i3.3408
• Keywords: incentives, remuneration, motivation of public officials
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4881655
• Publisher URL: https://revista.enap.gov.br/index.php/RSP/article/view/3408