Ambiguity when playing coordination games across cultures

Laban-�Peryman, Joanne; Kelsey, David

Abstract

We investigate how people coordinate within their own cultures, compared to interactions with people from different cultures. As players are likely to experience more ambiguity when playing a different culture, we expect players to choose safer strategies. We run experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game. Using a between-­-subjects design, we vary the identity of the opponent between someone of the same culture or a different culture. We compare the responses of British and East Asian students at the University of Exeter and show the cultural identity of the opponent by physical appearance. The players appear to use cultural stereotypes to predict behaviour, especially in the bargaining game which may require more strategic thought than the stag hunt game. In particular, the British act as though East Asians would behave more cautiously than other British. According to our results, the stereotype of East Asians being cautious is misleading.

Citation

Laban-­Peryman, J., & Kelsey, D. (2021). Ambiguity when playing coordination games across cultures. Theory and Decision, 90(3-4), 485–505. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09765-1

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 19, 2020
• Online Publication Date: Jun 27, 2020
• Publication Date: 2021-05
• Deposit Date: Jul 21, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 28, 2021
• Journal: Theory and Decision
• Print ISSN: 0040-5833
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-7187
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 90
• Issue: 3-4
• Pages: 485–505
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09765-1
• Keywords: Applied Psychology; Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous); General Economics, Econometrics and Finance; General Decision Sciences; General Social Sciences; Developmental and Educational Psychology; Computer Science Applications
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4780766
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-020-09765-1
• Additional Information: This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Theory and Decision. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09765-1