Contests with Ambiguity

Kelsey, David; Melkonyan, T

Abstract

The paper examines contests where players perceive ambiguity about their opponents’ strategies and determines how perceptions of ambiguity and attitudes to ambiguity affect equilibrium choice. Behaviour in our contest is affected by pessimistic and optimistic traits. Which of these traits dominates determines the relationship between the equilibrium under ambiguity (EUA) and behaviour where contenders have expected utility preferences. Our model can explain experimental results such as overbidding and overspreading relative to Nash predictions.

Citation

Kelsey, D., & Melkonyan, T. (2018). Contests with Ambiguity. Oxford Economic Papers, 70(4), 1148-1169. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy020

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 29, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Oct 9, 2018
• Publication Date: Jun 9, 2018
• Deposit Date: Jun 2, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 10, 2020
• Journal: Oxford Economic Papers
• Print ISSN: 0030-7653
• Electronic ISSN: 1464-3812
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 70
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 1148-1169
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy020
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4563792
• Publisher URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article/70/4/1148/5035346
• Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Economic Papers following peer review. The version of record David Kelsey, Tigran Melkonyan, Contests with ambiguity, Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 70, Issue 4, October 2018, Pages 1148–1169 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy020.